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Points of View from a Logical Perspective I.

Basic information
Original title:Points of View from a Logical Perspective I.
Authors:Marie Duží, Bjorn Jespersen, Pavel Materna
Further information
Citation:DUŽÍ, Marie, Bjørn JESPERSEN and Pavel MATERNA. Points of View from a Logical Perspective I. Organon F, Bratislava: Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2006, XIII, No 3, p. 277-305. ISSN 1335-0668.Export BibTeX
@article{750674,
author = {Duží, Marie and Jespersen, Bjørn and Materna, Pavel},
article_location = {Bratislava},
article_number = {3},
keywords = {points of view; transparanet intensional logic},
language = {eng},
issn = {1335-0668},
journal = {Organon F},
title = {Points of View from a Logical Perspective I.},
volume = {XIII},
year = {2006}
}
Original language:English
Field:Philosophy and religion
Type:Article in Periodical
Keywords:points of view; transparanet intensional logic

In the paper we offer a logical explication of the frequently used, but rather vague, notion of point of view. We show that the concept of point of view prevents certain paradoxes from arising. A point of view is a means of partial characterisation of something. Thus nothing is a P and at the same time a non-P (simpliciter), because it is a P only relative to some point of view and a non-P from another point of view. But there is a major, complicating factor involved in applying a logical method that is supposed to provide a formal and rigorous counterpart of the intuitively understood notion: 'point of view' is a homonymous expression, and so there is not just one meaning that would explain points of view. Yet we propose a common scheme of the logical type of the entities denoted by the term 'point of view'. It is an empirical function: when applied to the viewed object in question, it results in a (set of) evaluating proposition(s) about the object. If there is an agent applying the criterion, the result is the agent's attitude to the respective object.

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