Informace o publikaci
Corruption Game in Laboratory Experiment - Do the Economists Behave Differently?
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2014 |
| Druh | Článek ve sborníku |
| Konference | Proceedings of the 18th International Conference. Current Trends in Public Sector Research |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Obor | Ekonomie |
| Klíčová slova | economic experiment; corruption |
| Popis | Corruption has been identified as a major concern for social and economic development. An important step in understanding and addressing corruption is measuring the extent of this problem. Various approaches have been applied on investigating this phenomenon, from surveys describing current situation from sociological point of view, through more complex surveys focusing on beliefs about corruption (Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, or World Bank Governance Diagnostic Survey), to laboratory experiments (e.g. Cameron et. al. 2009). This paper discusses an economic experiment in corruption behavior, which follows modified experimental design created by Cameron. Obtained data sets show that behavior of economic agents diverges from predicted equilibrium, meaning that human beings do not achieve subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. The laboratory experiment was run at the Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University in Czech Republic. |
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