Publication details

Modely morálního soudu

Title in English The Models of Moral Judgment


Year of publication 2014
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Arts

Description More than 200 years have passed since the time when David Hume noted the outbreak of the dispute over the general foundation of morality - whether it is derived from the chain of reasoning or from fine inner sense. Are we getting closer to the solution of the question what is the nature of moral judgment? Is the process of moral judgment a matter of moral reasoning or moral intuition? And why we, as moral philosophers, should be concerned by it at all? Equipped by the most recent findings from the field of cognitive science and by the critical philosophical approach, we will try to find answers to these and many other questions. The general aim of this lecture is then to serve as a nice illustration of the mutually beneficial interaction between the cognitive science and philosophy.
Related projects:

You are running an old browser version. We recommend updating your browser to its latest version.

More info