Publication details
Social representations as a method of analysis of conceptualization in law
| Authors | |
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| Year of publication | 2019 |
| Type | Appeared in Conference without Proceedings |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Description | Exploring concepts of law should not end at the classical exegesis of black-letter law; even in civil law countries legal discourse is not limited to the statutes passed by legislative bodies but extends towards the judicial decisions or to extra-legal considerations. Accepting that law does not stop at the limits provided by the written statutes means that exploring legal concepts should not be based only on reading these statutes (or judicial decisions) and on their exegesis. Should we approach law as a discursive (social) space, it becomes clear that a legal concept is a much more diffused entity, one whose analysis needs a different approach. In this paper we argue that the method of social representations (as developed by Moscovici, 1962, and advanced since by others) and may provide means for such an approach. We explore the possibilities of how various methods of studying the so-called social representations of concepts may be employed in analysis of legal concepts, especially those that appear vague or ambiguous. To this end, we have tested one of the methods available on a group of law students and explored their understanding of the word “law”. Using the results of this research we discuss why it is a useful concept in studying legal concepts and how it can serve as link between the in-law meaning and the use-meaning of a concept. |