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Mohou být výluky z přezkumu nejvyššími soudy neústavní?
Title in English | Can Exclusions from Supreme Court Review Be Unconstitutional? |
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Authors | |
Year of publication | 2025 |
Type | Article in Periodical |
Magazine / Source | Soudní rozhledy |
MU Faculty or unit | |
Citation | |
web | Repozitář MU |
Keywords | Supreme court jurisdiction; legal remedies; exclusion from review; judicial hierarchy; constitutionality |
Attached files | |
Description | An agricultural company leases land on which it plants permanent vegetation. After the lease ends, it has a contractual right to reimbursement for its investment. However, in one of the most recent legal disputes over such a claim, the agricultural company lost its case at the District Court in Břeclav, even though in other cases the District Court for Prague 5 and the Regional Court in Brno had previously ruled in its favor. Whose side the law is truly on is beside the point here. What matters is that the differing decision of the District Court in Břeclav—due to the minor value of the claim—had to be overturned directly by the Constitutional Court because the court had failed to address the reasoning of the other courts. Why? Because the highest instances of general courts do not deal with disputes involving smaller amounts. Just like many other types of cases. Perhaps the most prominent example is the inadmissibility of appeals to the Supreme Court in family law matters. In addition, procedural regulations exclude cassation complaints to the Supreme Administrative Court in certain asylum or electoral cases, as well as in many procedural decisions of regional courts. In short, the highest instances do not get to address all types of disputes and the questions related to them. The aim of this paper is to outline a possible argument in favor of the unconstitutionality of various subject-matter exclusions from legal remedies submitted to the highest judicial authorities. The main line of argument is a systemic one: the existence of a supreme judicial body responsible for overseeing and unifying the decisions of lower courts. The perspective of the individual and their potential interest in repeated review is left entirely aside. The article first examines some of the indicated exclusions at the highest courts in civil and administrative matters. It then—taking into account literature and the Constitutional Court’s case law—addresses their potential unconstitutionality. It does not present an imperative conclusion, but rather aims to prepare the ground for further debate. |