Publication details
Rule of Law Compliance Beyond Ticking Boxes.
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2025 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | Hague Journal on the Rule of Law |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| web | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40803-025-00255-6#citeas |
| Doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/s40803-025-00255-6 |
| Keywords | Rule of Law; Conditionality; Informality; Legal culture; European Union; Judicial council; Gramsci |
| Attached files | |
| Description | The conditionality mechanism was built on an assumption that complex legal and societal relationships can be reduced to formal institutional indicators, and if these are adopted the Rule of Law can be reinstated. Using the example of Hungary, the present article demonstrates why this mentality of ticking boxes cannot capture the big picture. It will show three practical examples of implemented milestones and how the Hungarian government managed to circumvent them by informal networks, patronage politics and other means resulting in a non-progressive progression. Based on these insights, it highlights that several elements of legal culture affect how legal norms work. Because of their informal nature, they cannot be easily amended, challenged or objected to. Therefore, the European Commission often accepts measures and reforms at face value, without taking into account the particularities of a constitutional system. This is partly due to the fact that the centre and the periphery in Europe are culturally divided. The paper also tries to pinpoint the difference between a legal and political mindset, by introducing a Gramscian aspect, and showing how individual measures can add up to a long march through the institutions. |
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