Publication details
Mapping Selected Cryptographic Weaknesses in FIPS-140 Certified Products
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2026 |
| Type | Paper in proceedings |
| Conference | International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security 2026, TrustBus |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| web | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-35586-7_31 |
| Doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-35586-7_31 |
| Keywords | Cryptographic weaknesses; Cryptographic deprecation; FIPS-140 Validation |
| Description | FIPS 140 certification serves as a benchmark for cryptographic module security, yet certified modules often support deprecated algorithms long after their vulnerabilities are exposed. This study maps the persistence of several known cryptographic weaknesses for SHA-1, MD5, DES, Dual EC DRBG, and insecure TLS configurations within the FIPS 140 ecosystem. We analyze the lag between formal deprecation and industry remediation through machine learning classifiers. Our results suggest potential contrasts in how the industry responds to different types of findings. While algorithms implicated in trust scandals, such as the allegedly backdoored Dual EC DRBG, tend to disappear rapidly, other deprecated algorithms retain substantial inertia. SHA-1 and DES remain supported in approximately 72% and 28.6% of the inspected samples, respectively, within their queried subsets. |