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Can Ambiguity Aversion Explain Contributions to Public Goods?

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ŘEZÁČ Jan KUNA Vojtěch

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Fakulta / Pracoviště MU

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

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Popis Authors measured levels of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion (over both gains and losses). Subjects then participated in a one shot public goods game followed by conditional public goods game. It was hypothesized people highly ambiguity averse would make lower unconditional contributions, as the situation could be considered ambiguous, and higher conditional contributions, where no ambiguity exists. Results show there is no relationship between preference measures and contributions in public goods game, suggesting participants do not perceive the situation of public goods game as ambiguous. The only significant variable predicting their unconditional and conditional contribution was their stated belief about contributions of others.
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