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Motivation to corruption – economical experiment

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FIŠAR Miloš MALASTOVÁ Lucia

Druh Další prezentace na konferencích
Fakulta / Pracoviště MU

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

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Popis Corruption has been present in the society for ages and it keeps influencing many aspects of the people’s life. Recently, there have been a growing number of economical experiments exploring the corrupt behavior of subjects in different roles, cultures and under various conditions. This paper is inspired by already conducted experiments by Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner (2004) and Cameron et al. (2009) but brings a new design of the corrupt situation. We conducted an experiment to examine the question whether the officials awarded with higher wages are less likely to accept a bribe or not. In two treatments, the motivators of government, officials and citizens in the corrupt situations are examined. In the exogenous treatment (ExT), government sets an individual wage for the official choosing from 5 levels and is paid the average wage plus the remaining budget as a bonus. Official is then informed about his wage and is offered a bribe, value of which does not change. He can either accept or reject the bribe and his action influences government and also a citizen. Accepting imposes negative externality on the government and citizen and official receives the wage plus the bribe value. Citizen can report the corruption but it brings him additional costs and punishment for an official. We separate the influence of the wage choice of government in the endogenous treatment (EnT) where the ultimatum game is replaced with the strategy game so an official can decide if to accept or reject the bribe separately for changing wage levels. The citizen also decides if to report or not report the bribe acceptance at all the wage levels. Here we can watch the change of the behavior of both roles for changing wages. The results of ExT indicate that almost 50% of the subjects were maximizing their profit and ignoring the other incentives.
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