Informace o publikaci
Critical discussions, Ought-propositions, and Is-propositions
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2017 |
| Druh | Další prezentace na konferencích |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | According to the problem of Hume’s gap there are two main types of propositions, is-propositions and ought-propositions, and we cannot proceed from the former to the latter. In argumentation, arguing for an oughtproposition by an is-proposition is usually called the naturalistic fallacy or the is-ought fallacy. The same is true vice versa, i.e. arguing for an is-proposition by an ought-proposition. This is called the moralistic fallacy or the reverse naturalistic fallacy. Even though these moves are generally regarded as fallacious, they are often used in practice. The goal of this paper is to present an appropriate description of such cases where an is-proposition was justified by an ought-proposition in an unfallacious manner. The description is done using the pragma dialectical approach and the PVF-model. Within this approach, it is also necessary to examine a possible structure of starting points. |
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