Informace o publikaci
Utilitarian Explanation of Institutional Human Rights
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2026 |
| Druh | Recenzovaný odborný článek |
| Časopis / Zdroj | Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| www | https://biblioscout.net/article/99.140005/arsp202601009501 |
| Doi | https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2026-0005 |
| Klíčová slova | Institutional human rights; moral human rights; utilitarianism; welfarism; explanation; absolute rights |
| Popis | Theories that see moral human rights as a model for institutional ones face two problems, which can be described as the challenges of self-sufficiency and redundancy. This article shows that utilitarianism can explain the rightness of institutional human rights as well as many competing approaches. At the same time, it can deal well with both challenges mentioned above. This is due to the strengths of utilitarianism: minimizing the normative component and its broad applicability. It can explain key features of contemporary institutional human rights practice by working with empirical facts. The article thus tries to demonstrate that this theory of normative ethics should still have a place in debates on human rights philosophy. |
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