Publication details

Can we do without a metaphysical theory of personal identity in practice?

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Authors

BĚLOHRAD Radim

Year of publication 2014
Type Article in Periodical
Magazine / Source Prolegomena: Journal of Philosophy
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Arts

Citation
Web http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=191537
Field Philosophy and religion
Keywords justification; metaphysics; personal identity; practical concerns
Description In this paper I defend the idea that we need a metaphysical theory to justify identity-related practical concerns, such as self-concern. I outline D. Parfit's theory, in which the concerns receive a metaphysical justification. Then, I focus on two objections: C. Korsgaard's claim that the concerns are justified by the unity of agency, and M. Johnston's contention that the concerns are prima facie justified independently of a metaphysical theory. I argue that even if these theories have a point, they do not cover a range of situations in which justification may be sought. It is in these situations that a metaphysical theory may find its place.
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