Publication details
A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary
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| Year of publication | 2023 |
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| Description | Hybrid regimes occupy a middle ground between democracies and autocracies. We argue that the same applies to their rule of law. Just as hybrid regimes maintain the façade of democracy, they sustain judiciaries that seemingly mirror those of a functioning Rechtsstaat. This is paradigmatically shown in Hungary, a case tightly integrated into international organisations such as the European Union and the Council of Europe. Due to constitutional and international demands for judicial independence, informal means are used to exercise control over judges. Building on interviews with Hungarian judges, we propose that the influence over the judiciary is divided among three institutions: the Supreme Court (Kúria), the National Judicial Office, and the Constitutional Court. The institutions and their leaders are incentivised to compete for resources and influence, checking each other at the expense of a de facto independent judiciary. The institutions are constantly redesigned based on their efficacy and reliability and due to external constraints, resulting in an ebb and flow of their power and influence. We conclude that hybrid regimes can maintain the appearance of the rule of law by delegating and incentivizing control over the judiciary. They thereby escape measurement, maintain plausible deniability, and evade international pressure. |
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