Publication details
Lhát vědu
| Title in English | Lying Science |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2013 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | Etika a věda: etická dilemata ve vědecké práci |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Philosophy and religion |
| Keywords | Lie; Deception; Science; Methodology; Informed Consent; Experiment; S. Harris; S. Milgram |
| Description | One of the apparent ethical violations a scientist can commit is lying. Lying stands in the direct opposition to the goal of science: to produce a truthful knowledge. In this area, lying might have a fatal consequences. Implementation of the norm "it is not acceptable to commit a lie in the scientific research" seems rational. The author of the text tries to examine how this assumption is justified and if it is really possible to do science without lying. Intuitive acceptability of the norm aside, it is obvious that scientists use lying as an integral part of their methodology in many areas of their work. If that is true and the lying is useful, the assumption that lying violates the science is not sustainable. On the contrary, if we accept that science serves to benefit the man and that lying supports science in some regard, an interesting conclusion arises – excluding lies from scientific work is immoral. It is obvious that using lies in this regard must be strictly controlled, which offers many possibilities for a philosopher. |
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