Publication details
Identification of player types in ultimatum bargaining games
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2014 |
| Type | Article in Proceedings |
| Conference | Conference Proceedings of the 32nd International Conference Mathematical Methods in Economics |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Field | Psychology |
| Keywords | player types; cluster analysis; ultimatum game; deception; fairness |
| Description | Using cluster analysis I identified three types of players in two versions of the ultimatum bargaining game (with symmetric and with asymmetric information availability). I call the player types Fair players, Moderate opportunists and Hard-nosed opportunists. The player types constitute 23.1%, 43.3% and 33.6%, respectively, of the sample of 134 experimental participants. The types differ only moderately with respect to their choices in the standard ultimatum game. In particular, Hard-nosed opportunists make less generous offers than the two other types. However, there are very pronounced differences in behavior in the asymmetric information game. Fair players make fairer offers, misrepresent the surplus less frequently and to a lesser degree than the two other types. Hard-nosed opportunists are in turn less fair and more deceptive than Moderate opportunists in the asymmetric information game. Moreover, it is possible to infer that Opportunistic types are more strongly driven by fear of rejection (strategic concerns) and have weaker fairness preferences than Fair types. |
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