Political and Other Fundamental Group Rights
|Year of publication
|Article in Proceedings
|Cofola2017: Sborník z konference
|MU Faculty or unit
|Open access sborníku
|fundamental rights; group rights; intrinsic value
|Imagine a post (be it on an online social network or elsewhere) signed with the designation “a representative of the Department of Constitutional Law and Political Science MU”. Whose political rights would be violated if the post (the opinion expressed therein) was censored? Political rights of the person who has written the post? But what if she only copied the minutes of the department’s meeting and does not hold the opinion herself? All these questions relate to the issue of fundamental group rights. The concept of fundamental group rights is a concept which often appears in case law, however, which is not legally or philosophically very much anchored. The aim of this paper is to present one of the possible approaches to anchoring of this concept. This approach consists in critical reflection on the concept of fundamental rights as such leading to the conclusion that fundamental rights are to protect ideas as they are capable of assigning values (valuating) and thus are the only entities having real intrinsic value as they stand at the beginning of the chain of valuation. Group (especially the stable ones) are worth of the same protection as individuals as both in the minds of individuals and in the exchange of ideas within groups new ideas emerge which then contributes to the robustness of the civilization.