Publication details
European tacit collusion theory and its application to price algorithms
| Authors | |
|---|---|
| Year of publication | 2020 |
| Type | Article in Periodical |
| Magazine / Source | European competition law review |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Web | |
| Keywords | competition law; collusion; price algorithms |
| Attached files | |
| Description | The article’s aim is analysing the European case law and identifying the crucial elements of the concepts of agreements, concerted practices and a collective dominance that differentiate them from a tacit collusion concept. On these cornerstones, the theory of tacit collusion may be construed. Furthermore, the article illustrates how the theory is applied to the already dealt examples of algorithmic collusion and how to assess various kinds of possible algorithmic collusions in the future. Finally, based on the previous findings, it briefly elaborates on the possible outcomes of already suggested amendments of the legislation targeting price algorithms. |
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