Publication details
Court-packing, aneb jak obsadit soudy svými lidmi
| Title in English | Court-packing |
|---|---|
| Authors | |
| Year of publication | 2020 |
| Type | Chapter of a book |
| MU Faculty or unit | |
| Citation | |
| Attached files | |
| Description | Many politicians wish to pack the courts with ideologically alligned judges, or, at least, to limit the influence of judges from the opposing ideological camp. Some of these politicians however refuse to wait for the "natural" judicial turnover and decide to secure the quick ideological allignment with an interference into the courts' personal composition – packing the courts with their own "loyal" judges. Our paper addresses such intentional inferences into personal composition of courts. It provides a novel conceptualization of court-packing and identifies three court-packing strategies: (1) the expanding strategy, which includes techniques that increase the size of the court, (2) the emptying strategy, which results in a decrease in the number of sitting judges, and (3) the swapping strategy, which aims at replacing sitting judges. Subsequently, using a coprehensive comparative analysis, it identifies various court-packing techniques executed all over the world. This analysis serves as the first step to a broader theorising how to prevent and resist the court-packing. |
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