Publication details

Intuice v soudním rozhodování

Title in English Intuition in Judicial Decision-Making


Year of publication 2022
Type Article in Periodical
Magazine / Source Právník
MU Faculty or unit

Faculty of Law

Web Open access časopisu
Keywords intuition; thinking; decision-making; legal realism; cognitive science
Description Within legal theory and legal philosophy, we hardly ever see anyone dealing with intuitions, feelings, or emotions. These human "faculties" of ours are often disposed of by merely clouding judgment and are not objective but entirely subjective. If we also look at history, we rather rarely encounter these topics - the exception being legal realists whose work has not received much attention within our tradition and legal theory, whether it be American legal realism or Scandinavian legal realism. It is the question of intuitions that has received attention from the American legal realists, and since this text will deal with this issue, we will introduce their ideas in the first part. The aim of this paper is to introduce the ideas of the American legal realism in its uncaricated form, particularly in relation to the central theme of this paper, therefore intuitions and then show that the observations of american legal realists are consistent with how modern science views intuition and how intuition is presented. Thus, American legal realism can be seen as a successful descriptive theory, which was its aspiration, and it is therefore surprising that it does not have more attention within the theory and philosophy of law and that it rather reaps criticism. Another thing we will point out is that intuitions are not only a source of bias but they are also our very strong capability. According to the author, it is not appropriate to ignore them or just say intuitions have nothing to do in legal thinking. They are part of every thought, including the legal one, and should therefore be given room and attention.
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