Do costly signals assort cooperators during inter-group competition?
|Druh||Další prezentace na konferencích|
|Fakulta / Pracoviště MU|
|Popis||People around the globe participate in activities that involve self-harm, squandering of resources, and investment of time and energy. These activities are often part of cultural ceremonies and supposedly demonstrate commitment to the group. Researchers from various fields believe that these activities evolved to promote cooperation within groups by selecting individuals committed to collective action. Specifically, costly practices serve as indicators of a hidden cooperative phenotype, and only individuals with high phenotypic quality can afford them. Notably, previous research has shown that the frequency of costly signaling behaviors increases during times of war, presumably due to the need to reassure fellow group members of cooperative intentions. However, the direct relationship between costly signaling and increased cooperation during conflict has not been experimentally tested. In this presentation, I will discuss our efforts to answer this question through multiple studies using experimental manipulation to examine the effects of costly signals on cooperative selection, group cooperation, and resource sacrifice during inter-group competition. I will also discuss the limitations of costly signaling when applied to humans and our ongoing work on differential cost perception that may shed light on the human-specific form of signaling.|