Informace o publikaci
Legal Rules, Moral Norms and Arbitrariness
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2013 |
| Druh | Kapitola v knize |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | The chapter focuses on possible definitions of legal rules, moral norms and democratic principles as well as the relationships among these. We explore the underlying premise that the contents of legal rules as well as moral norms are defined arbitrarily. In contrast, the content of democratic principles is determined by the concept of democracy and democratic system. This specifies its content, yet, it depends entirely on the definition of the concept of democracy and is subject to its variability. While teleology does not fully impact on legal rules and moral norms, democratic principles are fully subjected to it. We will also attempt to demonstrate that legal rules must have a specific content that is defined while the same does not necessarily apply to moral norms. In a legal system we can operate with moral norms and in most cases specifying their contents is not necessary. Hence the concepts of legal rules and moral norms act as kinds of myths that in their bare existence necessarily characterize the legal system. This does not in any way prevent them from expressing societal value judgements and at the pragmatic level of the perception of law their contents overlap. |
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