Informace o publikaci

Using quantum key distribution for cryptographic purposes: A survey

Autoři	ALLEAUME R. BRANCIARD C. BOUDA Jan DEBUISSCHERT T. DIANATI M. GISIN N. GODFREY M. GRANGIER P. LANGER T. LUTKENHAUS N. MONYK C. PAINCHAULT P. PEEV Momtchil POPPE A. PORNIN T. RARITY J. RENNER R. RIBORDY G. RIGUIDEL M. SALVAIL L. SHIELDS A. WEINFURTER H. ZEILINGER A.
Rok publikování	2014
Druh	Článek v odborném periodiku
Časopis / Zdroj	Theoretical Computer Science
Fakulta / Pracoviště MU	Fakulta informatiky
Citace
Doi	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2014.09.018
Obor	Informatika
Klíčová slova	Key distribution; Quantum cryptography
Popis	The appealing feature of quantum key distribution (QKD), from a cryptographic viewpoint, is the ability to prove the information-theoretic security (ITS) of the established keys. As a key establishment primitive, QKD however does not provide a standalone security service in its own: the secret keys established by QKD are in general then used by a subsequent cryptographic applications for which the requirements, the context of use and the security properties can vary. It is therefore important, in the perspective of integrating QKD in security infrastructures, to analyze how QKD can be combined with other cryptographic primitives. The purpose of this survey article, which is mostly centered on European research results, is to contribute to such an analysis. We first review and compare the properties of the existing key establishment techniques, QKD being one of them. We then study more specifically two generic scenarios related to the practical use of QKD in cryptographic infrastructures: 1) using Q(D as a key renewal technique for a symmetric cipher over a point-to-point link; 2) using QKD in a network containing many users with the objective of offering any-to-any key establishment service. We discuss the constraints as well as the potential interest of using QKD in these contexts. We finally give an overview of challenges relative to the development of QKD technology that also constitute potential avenues for cryptographic research. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.