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Ex-ante targeting in lobbying strategies: an experimental study

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FIŠAR Miloš ŠPALEK Jiří URBANOVÁ Daniela

Druh Článek ve sborníku
Konference Proceedings of the 21st International Conference Current Trends in Public Sector Research 2017.
Fakulta / Pracoviště MU

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

Citace
WWW http://ctpsr.econ.muni.cz/cs
Obor Ekonomie
Klíčová slova lobbying; strategy; laboratory experiment
Popis As lobbying is currently an activity necessary for many interest groups including non-profit organizations, it is important to analyze a variety of potential strategies lobbyists may apply. We conducted a replication of a previous experiment to see whether theories about the ex-ante targeting of different policymakers hold. In the experiment, either two or three players of two types bid on simulated policymakers in order to succeed. In this article, we analyze two basic strategies – the theories of coalition expansion and counteractive lobbying – in terms of how often lobbyists target ex-ante supporters, the opposition, and undecided policymakers. We also focused on the size of lobbyist expenditures. Our investigation suggests that neither of the investigated strategies prevailed and other strategies may be naturally used by lobbyists.
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