Informace o publikaci

It Ought To Be therefore It Is: On Fallaciousness of so-called Moralistic Fallacy

Autoři

ONDRÁČEK Tomáš SVAČINOVÁ Iva

Rok publikování 2018
Druh Článek ve sborníku
Konference Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation: Volume II, Fribourg 2017
Fakulta / Pracoviště MU

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

Citace
Klíčová slova argument scheme; moralistic fallacy; ought-is inference; pragma-dialectics
Popis The problem of moralistic fallacy, crossing the gap from ought-propositions to is-propositions, is considered with regard to four questions: Should we consider all ought-propositions (or is-propositions) in the same manner? Is the ought-is move an inference or is it just a case of a practical assumption? Is this move fallacious in any discussion? To address these questions, we use the pragma-dialectical theory, where the ought-is relation is argumentatively considered as a relation between propositions in reason and standpoint.

Používáte starou verzi internetového prohlížeče. Doporučujeme aktualizovat Váš prohlížeč na nejnovější verzi.

Další info