Zde se nacházíte:
Informace o publikaci
European Security in Light of Energy Transition - Commodity Weaponization Assessment and Case Studies
| Autoři | |
|---|---|
| Rok publikování | 2025 |
| Druh | Další prezentace na konferencích |
| Fakulta / Pracoviště MU | |
| Citace | |
| Popis | With the upcoming energy transition in the European Union, it has become clear that the process of moving away from fossil fuels hinges on the supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) used to produce the ‘green technologies’ or even on supplies of the products themselves, as the manufacturing process is often located outside the countries of end-use. Effectively, the ability to increase power generation using solar PVs or wind turbines, as well as the whole process of switching from combustion engines to electromobility, depends on establishing and maintaining new supply chains, which are often partly or entirely located outside the Union, or even the so-called global North. The ever-growing demand for renewables, batteries, and other related technologies creates new dependencies, as the supply of these materials is often concentrated in just a few geographical areas. Although the EU may gradually shed its dependence on fossil fuels, a source of concern and politicization in the past, the dependence on foreign imports of CRMs and green tech supplies presents a new potentially significant risk. In essence, the EU risks exchanging one import dependence for another. Unfortunately for the bloc, the CRMs pose similar qualities to fossil fuels in terms of potential manipulation or outright weaponization. They, too, are unevenly distributed and possessed by just a handful of states. The high concentration of these resources would not be an outright security issue alone; however, the fact that a significant portion or even the entirety of mining, processing, and manufacturing is located in China does pose a concern. Given the country´s geopolitical and power aspirations stretching beyond Southeast Asia, the EU should not rely on China being a benign and like-minded power. With this in mind, the research sets these goals: Defining features of commodity and supply chain misuse and weaponization (conducted with exerting pressure and gaining geopolitical leverage as the main purpose) Developing an analytical model featuring a set of indicators identifying the presence of supply misuse and weaponization. The model is embedded in the realist IR thinking tradition and the strategic approach to energy policy. Applying the model to selected case studies to gauge the presence and extent of commodity or supply chain weaponization. The case studies are intended as theory-guided, disciplined interpretative case studies focusing on individual commodities and supply chains. |